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Jim P.

Level 6: Top Voice

Reviews by Jim P.

27

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Underperforming, Seemingly Unconcerned

My only Picheny investment, made through an investor group rather than directly, was a 2022 portfolio of four older Houston apartment properties bought with high-leverage floating-rate bridge debt. It was a total loss: about 0.01x back. In April 2023 the sponsor issued an unplanned capital call of 20% of original capital to buy a lender-required rate cap and refill reserves. Only about a third of the money sought was raised. Those of us who contributed were offered a promissory note ranking ahead of equity, but the loan went to partial payments and the lender foreclosed in April 2024. Nothing came back on either the equity or the note. To the sponsor's credit, the general partners put in significant new money of their own. The rate shock alone is not my complaint. The capital-call notice opened by highlighting past exits and forecast being back on plan within weeks. Ten months later the lender foreclosed, and investors were warned only four days before the foreclosure date. Since then I have seen no wind-down letter, final accounting, update on the note or K-1. The lack of communication has been disappointing as is the seeming lack of accountability for the complete loss of capital. The current track record on the website does not seem to include the deal I invested in and the operator is out raising capital again. I understand that not all investments are successful, but I have no desire to invest with someone who does not acknowledge their true track record and past mistakes. Bottom line: An aggressive debt structure, overly optimistic messaging and no close-out communication add up to a negative review. I would not invest with Picheny again.

Jim P.
Jim P.
11/19/2026

Average MF Operator, Car Washes a Disaster

PassiveInvesting.com runs large multifamily syndications and a series of express car-wash funds with its own in-house operator. I have two investments. The first, a 2020 Class A apartment deal near Charlotte, is closed and was well run: fixed-rate agency debt, occupancy in the mid-90s and steady 7-7.5% distributions. It sold about a year early and returned 100% of capital, for 1.27x and roughly a 6.5% IRR. That is far below the projected 2.15x and 13% IRR, and they said so plainly when they announced the sale. The second, a 2022 car-wash fund I hold a small slice of through an investor group, is struggling badly. Volume runs at half to two-thirds of underwriting, cash back is 0.075x and distributions have been suspended since late 2024. The latest report shows the fund losing cash, membership down 12% year over year and loans coming due in 2027. Management says it will need more money to get through mid-2027 and hasn't ruled out a capital call. The apartment updates came monthly. The car-wash updates dropped to quarterly in 2024 and blamed the weather while results declined. The newest quarterly report is the most candid and complete document I have from them and admits the weather doesn't explain the declines, but there is still no credible plan to get back on track. Bottom line: A capable multifamily operator that protected my capital during a difficult cycle. Even though, the MF deal turned out OK, I never got completely comfortable with their operations. I would definitely pass on their car-wash funds in the future and am unlikely to revisit the MF. One additional thing that never sat well with me - they spend money on fancy, glossy marketing materials that are mailed out to their investors for new apartment deals. I am sure it's not a huge cost, but it's unnecessary and left me thinking if they were ok wasting money on brochures, where else are they letting dollars slip through...

Jim P.
Jim P.
11/19/2026

Credit Fund - So Far, So Good

This is a recent investment, so will need updating after a full year has passed. Origin Investments is a large multifamily developer and lender. My only exposure is a position in its registered multifamily credit interval fund, bought in May 2026, so my file is thin: about six months, two distributions and a handful of documents. So far it is doing what it promised: an annualized distribution rate of about 9%, NAV within about 2% of its starting price, and a small positive net return since inception while major bond indices fell. In a rough third quarter with rising rates, management added floating-rate bridge loans, sold fixed-rate agency bonds at a gain and kept leverage near 20%. Reporting is monthly fact sheets plus quarterly letters with clear market commentary, though I was left off the update list for a while early on. Things to watch are the fees (a 4.67% gross expense ratio, or 2.57% excluding financing costs), liquidity limited to quarterly repurchase offers, and how much of the distribution turns out to be return of capital. Bottom line: A professionally run and promising start, but far too early to judge. A tentative thumbs-up for income investors comfortable with the fees and limited liquidity.

Jim P.
Jim P.
11/19/2026

Total Fraud from Well Known Podcaster

Norada is mainly a turnkey rental company, and it also raised money from its clients for cannabis and other projects. I made two high-yield loans in 2018 promising 15% or more, one to an Oregon cannabis grower and one to a Southern California cannabis development. My file is thin, just a few emails. The Oregon grow never produced the expected cash, and payments started years later than projected; it was closed out in 2022 with about 65% of principal back plus some interest, 0.78x overall. The California loan has returned nothing in more than eight years. The original project was dropped after approval and infrastructure delays and a collapse in cannabis prices, and a plan to recover value through a different development never happened. In late 2025 the sponsor told me the loan might have to be written off. Together the two loans have returned about 0.39x. Communication was irregular: a few updates in 2018, a frank 2021 letter laying out the Oregon shortfall and the options, then one update on the California loan in early 2024 and nothing more until I asked in late 2025. Problems were explained but never solved. These were speculative projects that failed, not victims of the rate cycle. The principal, Marco Santorelli has plead guilty to wire fraud - I can't find any information if that included my investments or not but that says all I need to know. Bottom line: Avoid.

Jim P.
Jim P.
11/19/2026